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NOTE
ARMS OF THE COURT: AUTHORIZING THE
DELEGATION OF SENTENCING DISCRETION
TO PROBATION OFFICERS
Amanda Rios*
Part authority figure and part social worker, probation officers
have long been recognized for their unique role in the criminal justice
system. District courts rely on probation officers to author the social
history of defendants through presentence reports, provide sentencing
recommendations, and to oversee defendants throughout their terms of
supervised release. Courts also delegate limited sentencing discretion to
probation officers to further the efficient administration of justice. For
example, courts have entrusted probation officers to manage administra-
tive tasks associated with supervised release, delegating the scheduling
of mental health treatment sessions to probation officers. The majority
of courts, however, have stopped short of delegating to probation officers
the determination of whether a defendant should undergo mental health
treatment at all. This Note endorses the minority position of the Eighth
Circuit that allows probation officers, as arms of the court, the discretion
to make this determination, provided that the court retains ultimate con-
trol over the sentence. This Note further argues that this delegation of
limited sentencing authority to probation officers is both statutorily and
constitutionally permissible. Finally, this Note argues that delegating
this decision to probation officers not only produces a better outcome for
defendants, but also for the judicial system as a whole.
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INTRODUCTION
The role of probation officers in the United States has come full
circle since the start of the movement in the mid-nineteenth century. As
a by-product of the rehabilitative penal philosophy, early probation of-
ficers were seen as specialized social workers of the court.' However,
over time, the rehabilitative model was replaced with the crime control
model, and probation officers, who were once sought out to paint a por-
trait of the individual defendant, now had a new role: to deliver a con-
cise, detailed account of the case, with barely any reference to the
individual characteristics of the defendant. 2 Fortunately, with the fall of
the United States Sentencing Guidelines (USSG), 3 probation officers
have returned back to their original role, as painters of the defendant's
life portrait.4
As specialized social workers of the court, probation officers fulfill
a unique role in the judicial system. Often referred to as arms of the
1 Sharon M. Bunzel, Note, The Probation Officer and the Federal Sentencing Guide-
lines: Strange Philosophical Bedfellows, 104 YALE L.J. 933, 944-46 (1995).
2 See id. at 946-49.
3 See United States v. Booker, 543 U.S. 220, 245 (2005) (holding the mandatory nature
of the USSG unconstitutional).
4 See OFFICE OF PROBATION AND PRETRIAL SERVS., ADMIN. OFFICE OF THE U.S.
COURTS, PUB. No. 107, THE PRESENTENCE INVESTIGATION REPORT (2006) [hereinafter 2006
Monograph].
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court,5 probation officers have gained the trust of the district courts,
which rely on them to protect the public and assist in the fair administra-
tion of justice through individualized sentencing recommendations. 6
Due to this reliance, district courts have expanded the role of probation
officers and delegated limited sentencing discretion to them. Courts
have gone back and forth over the permissibility of delegating decisions
regarding mental health counseling, random drug testing, and restitution
payments to probation officers.7 Currently, there is a circuit split involv-
ing mental health counseling as a condition of supervised release. It is
widely accepted that administrative tasks, such as the scheduling of
mental health counseling sessions and the location of these sessions, can
be delegated to probation officers. However, only the Eighth Circuit has
extended this discretion to allow probation officers the sentencing au-
thority to determine whether or not a defendant must engage in mental
health counseling at all.8 In contrast, the First, Second, Third, Fourth,
Seventh, Ninth, Tenth, and Eleventh Circuit Courts of Appeal reject
these scheduling delegations as amounting to the unconstitutional delega-
tion of a core judicial function. 9
This Note will examine this controversial delegation and ultimately
endorse the approach of the Eighth Circuit because it produces the most
effective treatment for defendants and promotes judicial economy. Since
the probation officer is the person in the judicial system that is most
familiar with the defendant's circumstances, the probation officer is bet-
ter suited to determine whether a defendant is in need of mental health
treatment and to simultaneously formulate a treatment schedule from
which the defendant is most likely to benefit. Additionally, the probation
officer meets with offenders much more frequently than the judge, and
experienced probation officers may have more effective and efficient
ways overall to handle problematic defendants. Furthermore, delegating
this sentencing authority to probation officers will likely produce quicker
treatment decisions because the probation officer possesses firsthand
knowledge of the case and more insight into the daily lives of defendants
than a district court judge, and because it will allow judges more time to
5 See United States v. Ruiz, 580 F.2d 177, 178 (5th Cir. 1978).
6 See 2006 Monograph, supra note 4, at 1-1.
7 See generally United States v. Stephens, 424 F.3d 876, 880 n.2 (9th Cir. 2005) (citing
cases where courts have delegated decisions regarding drug testing, mental health counseling,
and restitution payments to probation officers).
8 See, e.g., United States v. Mickelson, 433 F.3d 1050, 1057-58 (8th Cir. 2006).
9 See United States v. Mike, 632 F.3d 686, 695-96 (10th Cir. 2011); see also United
States v. Esparza, 552 F.3d 1088, 1091 (9th Cir. 2009); United States v. Miller, 341 Fed.
Appx. 931, 933-34 (4th Cir. 2009); United States v. Heath, 419 F.3d 1312, 1315 (11th Cir.
2005); United States v. Pruden, 398 F.3d 241, 251 (3d Cir. 2005); United States v. Sines, 303
F.3d 793, 799 (7th Cir. 2002); United States v. Allen, 312 F.3d 512, 516 (1st Cir. 2002);
United States v. Peterson, 248 F.3d 79, 85 (2d Cir. 2001).
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tend to their heavy dockets. Therefore, the court will save time and
money in delegating to probation officers.
Part I of this Note details the history of the probation officer move-
ment in the United States, from its inception to its current state. Part I
focuses on the unique role probation officers play in the legal system,
which, in turn, leads district court judges to entrust them with a certain
amount of authority. Part II of this Note sets forth the key constitutional
and statutory provisions involved in delegation challenges. Part II
sketches out the circuit split that has resulted from the various interpreta-
tions of these provisions regarding the delegation of the decision of
whether a defendant must complete mental health treatment as a condi-
tion of supervised release to probation officers. The majority of circuit
courts do not allow any delegation of this decision to probation officers,
but give probation officers discretion over administrative tasks associated
with the offender's mental health treatment. On the other hand, the
Eighth Circuit follows a more flexible approach that allows delegation of
this decision to probation officers as long as the court retains ultimate
control over the defendant's supervised release. Part III of this Note ar-
gues that the Eighth Circuit's flexible approach is both constitutional and
more advantageous from a policy perspective. The conclusion of the
Note calls for the Supreme Court to resolve the circuit split in favor of
the more flexible approach that the Eighth Circuit endorses.
I. THE HISTORY OF PROBATION OFFICERS IN THE UNITED STATES
A. The Birth of Probation Officers
Probation officers emerged out of the penal philosophy of rehabili-
tation.10 Under this model of punishment, "the primary purpose of penal
treatment is to effect changes in the characters, attitudes, and behavior of
convicted offenders, so as to strengthen the social defense against un-
wanted behavior, but also to contribute to the welfare ... of offenders."II
Rehabilitation and the desire to individualize sentences to the particular
offender were both at the core of the probation movement.12
John Augustus, "The Father of Probation," became the first known
probation officer in the United States in 1841, when he bailed out a man
in Boston whom he believed was "not yet past all hope of reformation,"
and successfully persuaded the court to reduce his sentence.' 3 After this
success, Augustus sought out similar individuals for what he called "pro-
bation," in which he would petition the court to suspend the defendant's
10 See Bunzel, supra note 1, at 938-41.
11 Id. at 936 (quoting FRANCIS A. ALLEN, THE DECLINE OF THE REHABILITATIVE IDEAL 2
(1981)).
12 See id. at 938.
13 See id.
ARMS OF THE COURT
sentence and grant release under Augustus' supervision. 14 In addition to
supervising the activities of these offenders, Augustus also aided them in
finding food, shelter, clothing, and employment.15 Augustus was well
trusted within the Boston courts, and between 1841 and 1859, judges
released over 2,000 offenders into his custody and supervision instead of
imprisoning them. 16
Due to Augustus' great success in the Boston courts, the Massachu-
setts legislature approved the nation's first statewide hiring of probation
officers in 1880. 1 The law required probation officers to "carefully in-
quire into the character and offense of every person arrested for
crime ... with a view to ascertaining whether the accused may reasona-
bly be expected to reform without punishment."' 8 The Massachusetts
model worked so well that by 1925, every state had probation officers for
juveniles.19 That same year, Congress passed the Federal Probation Act,
which provided for probation officers in federal courts. 2 0 By 1967, all
state courts also had adult probation laws.21 Thus, since the beginning,
courts and legislatures have given probation officers the unique role of
implementing the rehabilitation model within the criminal justice system.
B. The Early Role of Probation Officers
Under the rehabilitation model, early probation officers were
deemed specialized social workers of the court because they were in
charge of authoring the social history of the offender through presentence
reports (PSR).22 The probation officer's role as a social worker was ex-
plicitly acknowledged at a 1928 meeting of the National Probation Asso-
ciation, where probation officers were told, "[i]f there is any probation
officer here . . . who does not consider himself or herself to be a social
worker, . . . you are either going to change your mind and develop a
social work consciousness, or you are a member of a passing race." 2 3
Furthermore, much of the coursework for probation officers, even today,
has a social work focus, which includes courses on social problems and
pathology, psychology, and family casework or fieldwork. 24
14 See id.
15 See id.
16 See id.
17 See id. at 939.
18 Id. (quoting Act of Mar. 22, 1880, ch. 129, 1880 Mass. Acts 87 § 3).
19 Id.
20 See id.
21 Id.
22 See id. at 944. Presentence reports include detailed information about the offender's
personality and social situation so that the judge can keep in mind these characteristics when
determining the appropriate sentence for an offender. See id. at 940-41.
23 Id. at 944.
24 Id.
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Additionally, while in the social worker role, the probation officer
had many unique opportunities to get to know the offender and become a
person whom the offender could trust. During the compilation of a PSR,
the probation officer met with and interviewed the offender on many
occasions. 25 Most of the time, defense attorneys did not attend these
interviews, leading the offender to trust the probation officer as the one
person who could truly persuade the judge to consider a more lenient
sentence. 26 The offender, however, may have had a skewed view of the
probation officer. While it was true that the probation officer was work-
ing with the offender to gain insight into her personality and social back-
ground, including asking about any history of abuse or psychological
damage, the probation officer was simultaneously working with the pros-
ecutor to uncover any other possible criminal activity in which the of-
fender may have been engaged. 27
In all, the probation officer was a trustworthy player in
the system. With allegiances to no one but the court, the
officer's only "agenda" was to provide as much informa-
tion about the defendant to the sentencing judge as pos-
sible. The officer's association with rehabilitation kept
her from being perceived as a threat to the case of either
the prosecution or the defense.28
Thus, as the "eyes and ears" of the court, probation officers acted as
indispensable entities in the rehabilitation model of punishment because
they provided the crucial information needed to individualize
sentences. 29
C. The Changing Role of Probation Officers
The national standards for the appropriate format and contents of
PSRs have changed dramatically since the first monograph of the Proba-
tion Division of the Administrative Office of the United States Courts in
1943. The first monograph referred to the PSR as "the social investiga-
tion" or the "social diagnosis," indicating that the intended purpose of the
PSR was to be a diagnostic tool used to individualize sentences to the
defendant, not to the crime.30 The goal of the PSR, according to the
1943 monograph, was for the probation officer to bring the defendant to
25 See id. at 945.
26 See id. at 945, 963.
27 See Bunzel, supra note 1, at 942, 945.
28 Id. at 945 (arguing that the rise of the probation officer is a direct result of the domi-
nance of the penal philosophy of rehabilitation).
29 See id. at 945.
30 Id. at 942.
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life, focusing on the character and personality of the defendant.31 The
second monograph, published in 1965, made the individual offender's
personality and motivation a concern.32
In contrast, later monographs shifted the focus from depicting a so-
cial history of the defendant to recounting the facts of the case, with little
room for the personal characteristics of the individual.33 For example,
the third monograph, published in 1978 during the crime control puni-
tive-model era,34 was labeled the "core concept" approach because it in-
structed the probation officer to focus on a "core of essential
information," which was generally just the defendant's version of the
case.35 Probation officers treated any character or personality informa-
tion collected as "additional information, to be included in the PSR only
to the extent that it was pertinent to the sentence decision." 36 The goal of
the probation officer was transformed from making the defendant live on
paper, to producing factual and precise reports.37 This trend continued
until 2005, when the Supreme Court ruled in United States v. Booker that
the mandatory nature of the USSG was unconstitutional and sought to
make sentences more tailored to the individual, rather than to the
offense.38
The current monograph, published in 2006, appears less harsh to
defendants than the 1978 version and its progeny. Although the current
aim of the PSR is for probation officers to "provide a timely, accurate,
objective, and comprehensive report to the court," another goal is to pro-
vide "enough information to assist the court in making a fair sentencing
decision and to assist corrections and community corrections officials in
managing offenders under their supervision."39 The 2006 monograph
advises probation officers, in conducting their presentence interviews, to
"be open to receiving information from all parties, but [to] be cautious
about adopting any party's interpretation outright."40 In addition the
monograph encourages probation officers to explore the personal history
and background of the defendant. 41 Finally, the monograph recognizes
the uniqueness and individuality of each defendant, stating that "[t]he
31 See id.
32 See Bunzel, supra note 1, at 942. "Instead of giving an accumulation of cold facts the
report should rather present a true, vivid, living picture of the defendant." Id. at 943.
33 See id. at 947-48.
34 The crime control punitive model sets deterrence and incapacitation as the goals of
punishment, rather than rehabilitating the offender. See id. at 952-53.
35 See id. at 947.
36 Id.
37 See id.
38 543 U.S. 220, 226-27 (2005).
39 2006 Monograph, supra note 4, at I-1.
40 Id.
41 Id. at 1-2.
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report is designed to provide the court with a complete and concise pic-
ture of the defendant." 42 The "full picture" language is very similar to
the language used in the early monographs, which sought to make the
defendant live on paper. 43 Furthermore, the 2006 monograph includes an
entire section devoted to "offender characteristics," which includes: per-
sonal and family data; physical conditions; mental and emotional health;
substance abuse; education; vocational and special skills; employment;
and financial condition (ability to pay restitution).44 This section is in
stark contrast to the 1978 monograph, which treated any personal infor-
mation as "additional" to the factual report.45
D. The Special Relationship between Probation Officers, the Court,
and Defendants
Although the role of the probation officer changed as the theory of
punishment changed from rehabilitation to crime control, the fall of
mandatory sentencing guidelines has returned the probation officer back
to her original role as a trusted and invaluable investigator for the
court. 4 6 Therefore, the important relationship between the district court,
the probation officer, and the defendant must be explored in order to
understand what prompts district courts to delegate certain authority to
probation officers. United States v. Davis sets forth three principles of
the relationship that should guide delegation inquiries. 47 First, the dis-
trict court and the defendant must have an ongoing relationship in order
for the court to impose a sentence that includes a term of supervised
release. 48 Second, the probation officer must maintain contact with the
defendant to ensure compliance with the terms of the supervised re-
lease. 49 Lastly, and most importantly, the probation officer serves as "an
investigative and supervisory 'arm of the court.' "50 In this role, the pro-
bation officer must perform enumerated statutory requirements, includ-
42 Id.
43 Compare 2006 Monograph, supra note 4, at 1-2, with Bunzel, supra note 1, at 947.
44 See 2006 Monograph, supra note 4, at 111-24-31.
45 See Bunzel, supra note 1, at 947.
46 See 2006 Monograph, supra note 4, at I-1.
47 151 F.3d 1304 (10th Cir. 1998).
48 Id. at 1306.
49 Id.; Duties of Probation Officers, 18 U.S.C. § 3603(7) (1996):
A probation officer shall keep informed concerning the conduct, condition, and com-
pliance with any condition of probation, including the payment of a fine or restitu-
tion of each probationer under his supervision and report thereon to the court placing
such person on probation and report to the court any failure of a probationer under
his supervision to pay a fine in default within thirty days after notification that it is in
default so that the court may determine whether probation should be revoked . ...
Id.
50 Davis, 151 F.3d at 1306; see also United States v. Johnson, 935 F.2d 47, 49 (4th Cir.
1991).
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ing supervising defendants serving terms of supervised release.51 The
probation officer is also statutorily required to perform whatever tasks
the district court designates. 52 This statutory requirement creates a close
working relationship between the probation officer and the district court
because the probation officer must frequently report back to the district
court regarding the defendant's actions.53 "As a practical matter, then,
the probation officer serves as a liaison between the sentencing court,
which has supervisory power over the defendant's term of supervised
release, and the defendant, who must comply with the conditions of his
supervised release or run the risk of revocation."54 Therefore, given her
close relationship with both the court and the defendant, it is a logical
consequence for the court to delegate certain authority to the probation
officer. The probation officer's unique relationship with both the court
and defendants strengthens the argument for the delegation of limited
sentencing authority to probation officers.
Moreover, the strength of the unique relationship between the courts
and probation officers was recognized as early as 1973.55 Professor Eu-
gene Czajkoski argued that probation officers played a quasi-judicial role
51 See 18 U.S.C. § 3603 (1996). Probation officers are required to:
(1) instruct a person on supervised release, who is under his supervision, as to the
conditions specified by the sentencing court, and provide him with a written
statement clearly setting forth all such conditions;
(2) keep informed, to the degree required by the conditions specified by the sentenc-
ing court, as to the conduct and condition of a probationer or a person on super-
vised release, who is under his supervision, and report his conduct and condition
to the sentencing court;
(3) use all suitable methods, not inconsistent with the conditions specified by the
court, to aid a probationer or a person on supervised release who is under his
supervision, and to bring about improvements in his conduct and condition;
(4) be responsible for the supervision of any probationer or a person on supervised
release who is known to be within the judicial district; ...
Id.
52 Duties of Probation Officers, 18 U.S.C. § 3603(10) (1996) ("A probation officer shall
perform any other duty that the court may designate."); see also Davis, 151 F.3d at 1306;
United States v. Bernardine, 237 F.3d 1279, 1283 (1lth Cir. 2001). Regarding the seemingly
broad language of § 3603(10), the Fourth Circuit stated:
While the statute does authorize the district court to order the probation officer to
perform such duties as the court directs, the type of duty that the court may so
delegate is limited by Art. llt. Cases or controversies committed to Art. III courts
cannot be delegated to nonjudicial officers for resolution. That general principle
does not, however, prohibit courts from using nonjudicial officers to support judicial
functions, as long as a judicial officer retains and exercises ultimate responsibility
.... In every delegation, the court must retain the right to review findings and to
exercise ultimate authority for resolving the case or controversy.
United States v. Johnson, 48 F.3d 806, 808-09 (4th Cir. 1995).
53 Davis, 151 F.3d at 1306.
54 Id. at 1306-07.
55 See Eugene H. Czajkoski, D.P.A., Exposing the Quasi-Judicial Role of the Probation
Officer, 37 FED. PROBATION 9 (1973).
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in the courts. 56 Although Professor Czajkoski acknowledged the practi-
cal limitations on the authority probation officers can retain, he argued
that such limitations "often become[ ] blurred in the actual operation of
the court."5 7 Professor Czajkoski focused on five developments in the
courts, which have resulted in the expanded role of probation officers.58
These developments include: (1) the greater importance of plea bargain-
ing and the judges' abdication of their sentencing responsibilities in favor
of sentences that the defendant and the prosecutor agreed to; (2) the in-
creased frequency of probation officers participating in intake proce-
dures; (3) the probation officer's increased responsibility in setting the
conditions of probation; (4) the probation officer's role in initiating pro-
bation violation procedures against the offender; and (5) the probation
officer's ability to determine punishment. 59
The development most relevant to this Note is the probation of-
ficer's increased responsibility in setting the conditions of probation. Al-
though Professor Czajkoski conceded that the courts, not the probation
officers, set conditions of probation for offenders, he argued that courts
still grant probation officers great discretion in setting the conditions of
probation. 60 For example, courts frequently impose "blanket" conditions
of probation, such as "heed the advice of your probation officer," which
effectively grants the probation officer the power to set conditions of
probation. 61 Furthermore, although probation conditions must be clearly
and effectively communicated to the offender, probation conditions are
often ambiguous and require the probation officer to evaluate and inter-
pret the court's directive.62 One such example of a typical probation
condition is for the offender to "avoid undesirable associates." 63 It is
difficult for the offender to determine who exactly is an undesirable asso-
ciate-undesirable by whose standards?" Generally, there is no estab-
lished standard defining who falls into this category, so the enforcement
of this condition is often "left to the personal, and frequently capricious,
judgment of the probation officer."65 Thus, because the court already
trusts and relies upon probation officers to set certain conditions of pro-
56 See id.
57 Id. at 9.
58 See id. at 9-13.
59 See id.
60 Id. at 11-12.
61 Id. at 11.
62 Id.
63 See Czajkoski, supra note 55, at 11. Other examples of ambiguous conditions of pro-
bation include the directives to "stay away from disreputable places" and to refrain from
"keep[ing] late hours." Id.
64 Id.
65 Id.
ARMS OF THE COURT
bation, the delegation of limited sentencing authority is a logical and
efficient development.
Similarly, the probation officer's ability to determine punishment is
also a relevant consideration because it showcases the vast discretion that
courts afford probation officers. Professor Czajkoski argued that the pro-
bation officer's great latitude in restricting the offender's liberty amounts
to the ability to punish.66 This power stems from the blanket conditions
courts so frequently set. For example, the probation officer can require
that the probationer not live in or visit certain areas, not retain particular
jobs, or to refrain from associating with certain people.67 Such condi-
tions are often imposed under the sole discretion of the probation officer
and are clear restrictions on the offender's liberty. 68 Once again, this
observation supports the delegation of sentencing authority to probation
officers because, in a sense, they already have sentencing authority in
their power to punish offenders by restricting their liberty.
Additionally, probation officers have more direct ways to punish
defendants. 69 Notably, in some jurisdictions, offenders may not attain
driving or occupational licenses without the express approval of their
probation officers, and the withholding of the license approval can be
regarded as a punishment. 70 Moreover, "[i]f one chooses not to regard
the probation officer's withholding of license approval as punishment
and therefore not in the nature of a judicial action, it is at least still possi-
ble to conceive of the probation officer's approval role in licensing as
being quasi-judicial." 71
Further, the probation officer has the power to initiate probation vi-
olation procedures against the offender.72 While the ultimate decision to
revoke probation lies with the judge, the probation officer monitors for a
violation and informs the judge of the offender's actions.73 In fact, in the
majority of revocation proceedings, the judge closely follows the proba-
66 See id. at 13 ("With his awesome authority over the probationer, the probation officer
may in various ways restrict his liberty. It is easily argued that restriction of liberty amounts to
punishment").
67 Id.
68 Id.
69 See Czajkoski, supra note 55, at 13.
70 See id.
71 Id.
72 See id. at 12; see also United States v. Davis, 151 F.3d 1304, 1307 (10th Cir. 1998)
(holding that the probation office's practice of filing petitions seeking revocation of supervised
release is proper and within the officer's statutory authority to "report the conduct and condi-
tion [of a person on supervised release] to the sentencing court" (quoting 18 U.S.C.
§ 3603(2)).
73 See Czajkoski, supra note 55, at 12; see also Davis, 151 F.3d at 1307 ("[T]he sentenc-
ing court at most delegates to probation officers the power to recommend revocation proceed-
ings, and in light of probation officers' duty to report . . . [and] the probation officers'
supervisory and investigative functions, . . . no improper delegation of judicial power occurs");
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tion officer's recommendations. 74 Professor Czajkoski argued that the
probation officer's great power in these proceedings "plainly casts the
probation officer in a quasi-judicial role."75 Moreover, police and prose-
cutors often rely on probation officers to invoke a technical violation
against an offender when they suspect the offender has violated a condi-
tion of probation, but cannot easily prove the violation at trial. 76 Thus,
the probation officers' invocation of a technical violation cements their
quasi-judicial role, allowing the court to revoke probation without pro-
ceeding to trial and having to prove that the offender committed another
criminal act.77
II. DELEGATING SENTENCING DISCRETION TO PROBATION OFFICERS:
THE CIRCUIT SPLIT
A. Constitutional Basis for Delegation Challenges
Article III of the Constitution provides the constitutional basis for
delegation inquiries, vesting responsibility for resolving all cases and
controversies in the judicial branch.78 Justice Anthony Kennedy, while
sitting on the Ninth Circuit, observed that this responsibility is an essen-
tial role of the judiciary and requires "both the appearance and the reality
of control by Article III judges over the interpretation, declaration, and
application of federal law." 79 However, because the improper delegation
of judicial powers can erode the judiciary's essential role of resolving
cases and controversies, the doctrine of separation of powers forbids the
courts from delegating their Article III responsibilities.80 Although Arti-
cle III has been read to prohibit the delegation of judicial authority, it has
not been interpreted to prevent courts from using nonjudicial officers to
see also United States v. Burnette, 980 F.Supp. 1429, 1435 (M.D. Ala. 1997) (noting that
probation officers are the "eyes and ears" of the courts).
74 See Czajkoski, supra note 55, at 12; see also John Rosecrance, The Probation Of-
ficers' Search for Credibility: Ball Park Recommendations, 150 PLI/CRIM. 159, 159-60
(1989) ("Studies of sentencing practices reports a consistently high rate of agreement between
probation officer recommendations and judicial disposition").
75 See Czajkoski, supra note 55, at 12.
76 See id. Technical violations are violations "which are somehow covered by the condi-
tions of probation but which are not specified in criminal statutes." Id. For example, an of-
fender's failure to report to the probation officer or failure to avoid "undesirable persons" can
be considered a type of technical violation. Id.
77 Id.
78 U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2, cl. 1.
79 Pacemaker Diagnostic Clinic of America, Inc. v. Instromedix, Inc., 725 F.2d 537, 544
(9th Cir. 1984).
80 See United States v. Melendez-Santana, 353 F.3d 93, 101 (1st Cir. 2003).
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support judicial functions, so long as the courts retain ultimate
responsibility. 8
B. Statutory Basis for Delegation Challenges
In imposing a sentence of imprisonment, 18 U.S.C. § 3553 directs
district court judges to sufficiently satisfy the following purposes:
(A) to reflect the seriousness of the offense, to promote
respect for the law, and to provide just punishment for
the offense; (B) to afford adequate deterrence to criminal
conduct; (C) to protect the public from further crimes of
the defendant; and (D) to provide the defendant with
needed educational or vocational training, medical care,
or other correctional treatment in the most effective
manner. 82
In addition to fulfilling the purpose of sentencing, the court must
also consider specific factors when determining what sentence to im-
pose.83 The court must consider the nature and circumstances of the of-
fense committed, the defendant's history and personal characteristics, the
kinds of sentences available, and the established sentencing ranges for
the category of offense that the defendant committed.8 4 In addition, the
court must "avoid unwarranted sentence disparities among defendants
with similar records who have been found guilty of similar conduct,"
while keeping the need to provide restitution to the victims of the offense
in mind.85 Furthermore, the court must consider any pertinent policy
statements regarding sentencing.8 6
The above factors governing the imposition of a prison term also
guide the court in imposing a term of supervised release on a defen-
dant. 7 Similarly, district court judges also use § 3583 to guide the
length and conditions of supervised release to be imposed.88 The statute
repeatedly refers to "the court" as having authority to make sentencing
81 United States v. Allen, 312 F.3d 512, 515-16 (1st Cir. 2002) (quoting United States v.
Johnson, 48 F.3d 806, 809 (4th Cir. 1995)). This Note argues that the Eighth Circuit's ap-
proach does not offend this reading of Article III.
82 Imposition of a Sentence, 18 U.S.C. § 3533(a)(2) (2006).
83 See id. § 3553(a).
84 Id.
85 See id. § 3553(a)(6)-(7).
86 See id. § 3553(a)(5).
87 Inclusion of a Term of Supervised Release After Imprisonment, 18 U.S.C. § 3583(c)
(2006). But see United States v. Sicher, 239 F.3d 289, 291 (3d Cir. 2000) (stating that in order
to impose a term of supervised release, it is not necessary that all of the factors identified in
§ 3553(a) be present).
88 See 18 U.S.C. § 3583(b) (the authorized length of terms of supervised release by class
of felony); see also § 3583(d) (discussing conditions of supervised release).
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determinations and set conditions of supervised release. 89 In addition to
setting forth certain enumerated conditions of supervised release related
to the defendant's crime,
[t]he court may order, as a further condition of super-
vised release, to the extent that such condition-(1) is
reasonably related to the [above stated] factors set forth
in §§ 3553(a)(1), (a)(2)(B), (a)(2)(C), and (a)(2)(D); (2)
involves no greater deprivation of liberty than is reason-
ably necessary for the purposes set forth [and] . . , (3) is
consistent with any pertinent policy statements issued by
the Sentencing Commission . . . any other condition set
forth as a discretionary condition of probation . . . and
any other condition it considers to be appropriate. 90
Although the § 3553(a) factors are broad, they still impose a real restric-
tion on the district court's ability to impose conditions of supervised re-
lease.91 For example, even though a condition might have clear
rehabilitative effect, a court cannot impose the condition "without evi-
dence that the condition imposed is 'reasonably related,' that is, related
in a 'tangible way,' to the crime or to something in the defendant's his-
tory." 9 2 The court in United States v. Pruden concedes that this is not a
very high standard, but nonetheless argues it is "a standard with teeth." 93
The court argues that a condition with no basis, or only a tenuous basis in
the record, will inevitably be in violation of § 3583(d)(2), since condi-
tions of supervised release cannot involve a "greater deprivation of lib-
erty than is reasonably necessary." 94
Furthermore, the court may also modify or revoke the imposed con-
ditions of supervised release. 95 Modifications may: (1) terminate a term
of supervised release and thus discharge a defendant of supervision; (2)
extend a term of supervised release and thereby impose additional re-
strictions on the defendant; or (3) reduce the conditions of supervised
release.96 Moreover, revocation of supervised release is yet another op-
tion for the district court.97 Such revocation would require the defendant
89 See id. § 3583.
90 See id. § 3583(d).
91 See United States v. Pruden, 398 F.3d 241, 248 (3d Cir. 2005).
92 Id. at 248-49 (quoting United States v. Evans, 155 F.3d 245, 249 (3d Cir. 1998)).
93 See id. at 249.
94 Id. (quoting § 3583(d)(2)). For example, in Pruden, the Third Circuit found that the
imposition of a condition of supervised release requiring the defendant to undergo mental
health counseling was plain error because the district court "did not point to any evidence that
any of the § 3553(a) factors were present." Id.
95 See id. § 3583(e).
96 See id. § 3583(e)(l)-(2).
97 See id. § 3583(e)(3).
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"to serve in prison all or part of the term of supervised release .. . for the
offense . . . without credit for time previously served on post release
supervision, if the court ... finds ... that the defendant violated a condi-
tion of supervised release."98
In sum, these important statutory provisions governing the imposi-
tion of a sentence99 and the inclusion of a term of supervised release after
imprisonment'" give the courts authority to make sentencing and super-
vised release decisions. As previously noted, § 3553(a), which sets forth
factors that courts must consider when imposing a sentence, begins,
"[t]he court shall impose a sentence sufficient, but not greater than neces-
sary ... ."1o Likewise, § 3583 details the terms and conditions to guide
the court when imposing a term of supervised release. 102
Since the district courts must follow the aforementioned statutory
guidelines for sentencing, defendants on supervised release may chal-
lenge their sentences and the amount of authority the judge has delegated
to the probation officer. 03 These challenges usually target the district
court's delegation of authority to the probation officer and consist of ap-
pealing to the circuit court or filing a motion to revise the sentence with
the district court judge.' 04
C. The Circuit Split
All circuits that have ruled on the issue 05 agree that it is permissi-
ble to delegate some discretion to probation officers regarding mental
health treatment' 0 6 as a condition of a defendant's supervised release.
98 Id.
99 See generally § 3553.
100 See generally § 3583.
101 § 3553(a).
102 § 3583.
103 See, e.g., United States v. Kent, 209 F.3d 1073 (8th Cir. 2000) (holding that the
Court's delegation of authority to determine whether the defendant should undergo mental
health counseling to the probation officer was improper).
104 See Ronald S. Chapman, Is Your Probation Officer Exceeding His or Her Authority?,
WEST PALM BEACH CRIMINAL LAWYER BLOG, July 27, 2008, http://www.justiceflorida.com/
2008/07/articles/florida-law-regarding-probatio/is-your-probation-officer-exceeding-his-or-
her-authority/. For example, when an offender is placed on probation in Florida, the sentenc-
ing judge orders the offender to comply with certain conditions of the probation. "As long as
the probation officer is simply supervising a specific, judge-ordered condition of probation, all
is well. However, problems arise whenever a judge delegates authority to a probation officer
to impose what amounts to additional conditions of probation." Id.
105 The Fifth and Sixth Circuits have not yet ruled on this issue. Although the Fifth
Circuit has not specifically spoken on the issue of delegation, it appears the court might follow
the Peterson circuits, holding that delegation of administrative tasks to probation officers is not
a plain error. United States v. Turpin, 2011 U.S. App. LEXIS 4017, at *3-4 (5th Cir. Mar. 1,
2011).
106 Courts include psychological or psychiatric counseling programs and sex offender
counseling in the term mental health treatment. See, e.g., United States v. Kent, 209 F.3d
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However, circuits differ over the degree of discretion that courts should
afford to probation officers. The majority of circuits hold that the court,
not the probation officer, must make the decision of whether a defendant
is to engage in mental health treatment.' 07 In contrast, the Eighth Circuit
holds that it is permissible for a probation officer to make this determina-
tion, so long as the court does not explicitly abdicate its authority in the
ongoing supervision of the defendant's supervised release.'08
The majority circuits generally follow the rule set forth in United
States v. Peterson, which states:
If [the defendant] is required to participate in a mental
health intervention only if directed to do so by his proba-
tion officer, then this special condition constitutes an im-
permissible delegation of judicial authority to the
probation officer . . .. On the other hand, if the [d]istrict
[c]ourt was intending nothing more than to delegate to
the probation officer details with respect to the selection
and schedule of the program, such delegation was
proper. 109
Peterson relies primarily on the USSG to support the distinction." 0
While the USSG places authority in the court to impose conditions of
probation,"'I it also states that the court may impose "a condition requir-
ing that the defendant participate in a mental health program approved by
the United States Probation Office."1 2 Peterson cites the former lan-
guage to support its stance that only the court, and not the probation
officer, can determine whether a defendant must undergo mental health
treatment as a condition of supervised release.113 Peterson argues that
the latter language allows courts to delegate the scheduling of treatment
sessions to probation officers.114
1073, 1074 (8th Cir. 2000) (discussing psychological or psychiatric counseling); United States
v. Peterson, 248 F.3d 79, 84 (2d Cir. 2001) (discussing sex offender counseling).
107 See, e.g., United States v. Mike, 632 F.3d 686, 695-96 (10th Cir. 2011); see also
United States v. Esparza, 552 F.3d 1088, 1091 (9th Cir. 2009); United States v. Miller, 341
Fed. Appx. 931, 933-34 (4th Cir. 2009); United States v. Heath, 419 F.3d 1312, 1315 (11 th
Cir. 2005); United States v. Pruden, 398 F.3d 241, 251 (3d Cir. 2005); United States v. Sines,
303 F.3d 793, 799 (7th Cir. 2002); United States v. Allen, 312 F.3d 512, 516 (1st Cir. 2002);
Peterson, 248 F.3d at 85.
108 See United States v. Thompson, 653 F.3d 688, 693 (8th Cir. 2011); see also United
States v. Mickelson, 433 F.3d 1050, 1057-58 (8th Cir. 2006).
109 Id. at 85.
110 See id.
I'' See id. (quoting U.S.S.G. § 5B1.3(b)).
112 Id. (quoting U.S.S.G. § 5Bl.3(d)(5)).
113 See id.
114 See id.
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Similarly, the majority circuits also interpret Article III of the Con-
stitution narrowly, holding that delegating the authority to determine
whether the defendant must undergo mental health treatment to a proba-
tion officer is improper. These circuits hold that requiring the defendant
to participate in treatment and counseling programs as a condition of
supervised release amounts to the imposition of a sentence, which is a
core judicial function that judges may not delegate to nonjudicial proba-
tion officers.115 Although probation officers are authorized to manage
aspects of sentences and to supervise those on supervised release, "[n]o
statutory provision, however, assigns a probation officer any judicial
function." 116 Furthermore, while probation officers are authorized to
"perform any [ ] duty that the court may designate,"' 17 the majority cir-
cuits read Article III's Cases and Controversies Clause as limiting this
seemingly broad authorization, and hold that these authorizations are in
fact delegations of judicial functions in violation of Article 111.118 "Re-
quiring a defendant to participate in a mental health program as a condi-
tion of his supervised release is unquestionably a judicial function"
because it imposes a sentence on the defendant.119
In contrast to the Peterson rule, the minority Eighth Circuit allows
probation officers to determine whether the defendant will undergo
mental health treatment if there is no indication that the court will not
retain ultimate control over the condition of supervised release. 120 Both
the majority and minority circuits rely on the same constitutional and
statutory provisions, but differ in interpreting the point at which the dis-
trict court's ultimate authority over the sentence is lost.12 1 For the major-
ity, the trigger is as soon as the probation officer is permitted to
determine whether the defendant must undergo mental health treat-
115 See, e.g., United States v. Heath, 419 F.3d 1312, 1315 (11th Cir. 2005); see also
United States v. Johnson, 48 F.3d 806, 808 (4th Cir. 1995).
116 Johnson, 48 F.3d at 808.
117 18 U.S.C. § 3603(10) (2010).
118 See U.S. CONST. art. lII, § 2, cl. 1; see also Heath, 419 F.3d at 1315; Johnson, 48 F.3d
at 808-09.
119 Heath, 419 F.3d at 1315.
120 See United States v. Wynn, 553 F.3d 1114, 1120 (8th Cir. 2009). The court notes that
even if a district court does not explicitly claim that it will retain ultimate control over the
decision of whether a defendant should complete mental health counseling as a condition of
supervised release, the probation officer will most likely consult with the court about the mat-
ter. See id. The court also stated that a district court could hear a defendant's motion for
reconsideration of the probation officer's decision. See id.
121 Compare United States v. Peterson, 248 F.3d 79, 85 (2d Cir. 2001) (explaining the
district court loses authority upon allowing the probation officer to determine whether the
defendant needs treatment) with United States v. Mickelson, 433 F.3d 1050, 1057-58 (8th Cir.
2006) (explaining that the district court loses authority when it indicates it will not retain final
authority over the conditions of supervised release and instead suggests that final authority
vests in the probation officer).
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ment.122 In contrast, the Eighth Circuit finds that the district court's au-
thority is lost only when the district court specifically indicates that it is
abdicating its authority over the defendant to the probation officer.123
Therefore, the Eighth Circuit does not have an entirely different interpre-
tation of the constitutional or statutory provisions than the majority cir-
cuits. Instead, the Eighth Circuit sees the probation officer as an arm of
the court, granting the probation officer discretion to determine whether
the defendant should undergo mental health treatment without disclaim-
ing the district court's responsibility for the defendant. 124
For example, in United States v. Mickelson, the Eighth Circuit up-
held three conditions of supervised release despite the defendant's argu-
ment that the conditions constituted an improper delegation of the court's
authority to the probation officer.125 The special conditions required the
defendant to participate in alcohol testing, to be placed on a Global Posi-
tioning Satellite (GPS) system for tracking, and to receive mental health
counseling, all at the discretion of the probation officer.126 The court
expressed a preference for flexible conditions of supervised release be-
cause such flexibility "can serve a defendant's interests since they can be
tailored to meet his specific correctional needs."1 27 The court ruled that
the delegations were proper, and under the language of the delegations,
the court retained and exercised ultimate responsibility for the defen-
dant's sentence.128 The court also distinguished the case from United
States v. Kent, in which the court rejected delegation of the decision
whether a defendant's supervised release should include mental health
treatment to a probation officer.129 The Mickelson court determined that
the district court "gave no indication that it would not retain ultimate
authority over all of the conditions of Mickelson's supervised release,"
whereas the sentencing district court in Kent "could have been inter-
preted to vest final authority in the probation office." 30
In contrast, the Eighth Circuit in Kent noted that the district court
clearly sought to abdicate its role in determining whether the defendant
should undergo psychiatric treatment, stating, "the court explicitly stated
122 See, e.g., Heath, 419 F.3d at 1315.
123 See, e.g., United States v. Smart, 472 F.3d 556, 560 (8th Cir. 2006).
124 See Wynn, 553 F.3d at 1120.
125 Compare Mickelson, 433 F.3d at 1056-57 (holding that judges can delegate limited
authority to probation officers to determine probation conditions as long as the judge retains
ultimate responsibility), with Kent, 209 F.3d 1073, 1074 (8th Cir. 2000) (holding that judges
cannot delegate the authority to determine whether a defendant should undergo mental health
counseling to probation officers, but limited the holding to the facts of the case).
126 See Mickelson, 433 F.3d at 1051.
127 Id. at 1057 (citing United States v. Cooper, 171 F.3d 582, 587 (8th Cir.1998)).
128 See id. at 1056-57.
129 See id.
130 Id. at 1057.
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it hoped it would not be 'riding herd' in the probation officer's decision
to require Kent to undergo psychiatric treatment."13 1 Although the Kent
court struck down the delegation, it limited its decision to the facts of the
case, recognizing that "federal district courts cannot be expected to po-
lice every defendant to the extent that a probation officer is capable of
doing." 1 3 2 Therefore, so long as the court retains and exercises the ulti-
mate responsibility for the conditions of supervised release, limited dele-
gations to probation officers of the determination of the necessity of
mental health treatment sessions are permissible in the Eighth Circuit
because probation officers are on the ground with defendants and better
suited to identify the needs of defendants as they arise.133
III. SUPPORTING DELEGATION OF AUTHORITY TO IMPOSE MENTAL
HEALTH TREATMENT TO PROBATION OFFICERS
This Note endorses the Eighth Circuit's side of the split, which ex-
tends the greatest amount of sentencing discretion to probation officers,
because it allows for more flexibility in sentencing and is the best ap-
proach for both the judicial system and defendants. The Eighth Circuit's
view permits limited delegation of sentencing authority, such as the abil-
ity to determine whether a defendant should engage in mental health
therapy, with the district court ultimately retaining responsibility for the
sentence through general regulation of the defendant's supervised re-
lease.134 This Note will argue that authorizing the district court judge to
delegate a wider amount of discretion in sentencing to the probation of-
ficer is the better policy alternative because it will promote the defen-
dant's rehabilitation and overall judicial economy.
A. Sentencing Delegations are Constitutionally and Statutorily
Permissible
In contrast to the majority's position, the Eighth Circuit's stance
does not circumvent the constitution or statutory provisions governing
supervised release because the court retains ultimate authority over the
sentence through the court's oversight of the conditions of supervised
release and the defendant's ability to appeal to the court.135 The USSG
vests the power to impose a sentence in the courts. 13 6 However, the
USSG also vests power in the probation office regarding substance
131 Kent, 209 F.3d at 1079.
132 Id.
133 See United States v. Mickelson, 433 F.3d 1050, 1057 (8th Cir. 2006) (citing United
States v. Cooper, 171 F.3d 582, 587 (8th Cir. 1998)).
134 See id. at 1056-57; see also United States v. Thompson, 653 F.3d 688, 693 (8th Cir.
2011); United States v. Conelly, 451 F.3d 942, 945 (8th Cir. 2006).
135 See 18 U.S.C. § 3583(e); see Mickelson, 433 F.3d at 1056-57.
136 See U.S.S.G. § 5B 1.3(b) ("The court may impose other conditions of probation.
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abuse'37 and mental health programs.138 Thus, courts that merely follow
the Peterson rule ignore the intent of these USSG provisions to give the
probation office explicit discretion in these areas.'39 The Eighth Circuit
is simply acknowledging the statutory discretion already entrusted to
probation officers and endorsing the discretion to address the realities of
the judicial system. Generally, the court learns about the defendant's
deep-seated mental health issues only through the probation officer's in-
vestigation of the defendant's life. But sometimes such problems do not
manifest until supervised release, and the probation officer, as an arm of
the court, must be granted authority to place an offender in treatment to
address mental health issues that arise during the course of supervised
release. Moreover, judges cannot attend to every defendant's special
needs during the periods of supervised release because they are over-
whelmed with mountain-high piles of cases on their desks. And as much
as some judges may want to get to know their defendants, they generally
achieve this knowledge only through the PSRs probation officers submit,
and reports from probation officers during the course of supervised re-
lease.140 This reality is exactly why the courts already rely so heavily on
probation officers and precisely the reason why courts should continue to
do so.
Furthermore, the Eighth Circuit's approach does not offend Article
III of the Constitution, which vests the responsibility to resolve all cases
and controversies with the judiciary.141 When the court delegates to the
probation officer the discretion to determine whether treatment sessions
are necessary, the court still retains responsibility for resolving the case
because the court always retains ultimate authority over the defendant. 142
137 See U.S.S.G. § 5B1.3(d)(4):
The following "special" condition[ ] of probation [is] recommended ... if the court
has reason to believe that the defendant is an abuser of narcotics, other controlled
substances or alcohol-a condition requiring the defendant to participate in a pro-
gram approved by the United States Probation Office for substance abuse, which
program may include testing to determine whether the defendant has reverted to the
use of drugs or alcohol.
138 See USSG § 5B1.3(d)(5) ("The following "special" condition[] of probation [is] rec-
ommended ... if the court has reason to believe that the defendant is in need of psychological
or psychiatric treatment-a condition requiring that the defendant participate in a mental
health program approved by the United States Probation Office") (emphasis added).
139 Compare United States v. Heath, 419 F.3d 1312, 1315 (11th Cir. 2005) (holding that a
judge cannot delegate the decision of whether a defendant should undergo mental health treat-
ment as a condition of supervised release to a probation officer because it is a judicial func-
tion), with USSG § 5B1.3(d)(5) (permitting a court to require a defendant to participate in a
mental health program approved by the United States Probation Office).
140 See Bunzel, supra note 1, at 941-44 (stressing the important role the PSR plays in
educating the district court about the defendant).
141 See U.S. CONsT. art. III, § 2, cl. 1.
142 See United States v. Thompson, 653 F.3d 688, 693 (8th Cir. 2011) (quoting United
States v. Wynn, 553 F.3d 1114, 1120 (8th Cir. 2009)) (". . . such an impermissible delegation
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Implicit in these decisions is an assumption that where
the district court does not disclaim ultimate responsibil-
ity for deciding the appropriateness of mental health
counseling, it is likely that the probation officer will con-
sult with the court about the matter or, at a minimum, the
court will entertain a motion from the defendant for re-
consideration of the probation officer's initial
decision.14 3
Thus, it is unlikely that the probation officer will commit the defendant
to mental health treatment without any involvement from the court. Ad-
ditionally, if the court does not agree with the decision of the probation
officer, it can override the probation officer's discretion through a modi-
fication of the supervised release conditions. 1" As such, in accordance
with Article III, the court retains the responsibility to resolve the defen-
dant's case. Moreover, if the defendant is unhappy with the conditions
the probation officer sets, the defendant can seek relief from the district
court.145
B. Probation Officers and Judges Already Agree on Sentencing
Matters
More often than not, the probation officer will be able to determine
conditions that both the court and the defendant will agree with. The
bulk of the probation officer's work with the court occurs through the
preparation of the PSR, which aids the judge in imposing the most intel-
ligent, informed sentence possible. 14 6 Studies have shown there is a very
high rate of agreement between the probation officer's recommendation
and the ultimate judicial disposition. 147 This high level of agreement
stems in part from the trusting relationship between the court and proba-
tion officers. "District courts rely upon probation officers every day for
the necessary information regarding an appropriate sentence"; the courts
also inherently trust the probation officers.148 Thus, courts delegate to
probation officers because they trust that the officers will come to a rea-
sonable determination regarding the sentence.
occurs only where the district court gives an 'affirmative indication' that it will not retain
'ultimate authority over all of the conditions of supervised release"').
143 Wynn, 553 F.3d at 1120.
144 See 18 U.S.C. § 3583(e).
145 See United States v. Lykken, 2001 WL 1789405, *3 (D. N. Dakota Oct. 22, 2001)
(holding that the probation officer can recommend treatment for the defendant and if the de-
fendant disagrees, he can seek relief in the district court by seeking modification of the condi-
tion of probation or opposing the probation officer's petition).
146 See discussion of the PSR, supra Parts I.B-C.
147 See Rosecrance, supra note 74, at 159.
148 United States v. Weinberger, 268 F.3d 346, 362 (6th Cir. 2001) (Cohn, J., concurring).
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There are three additional explanations for this high agreement rate.
First, the probation officer devotes much more time to investigating the
defendant's circumstances than judges, and can control the information
that judges receive. 149 Therefore, judges are more apt to agree with the
probation officer, because judges possess little more information than
what the probation officer relays, and are likely to follow the probation
officer's recommendations. 1 -0 Secondly, a seasoned probation officer
may be able to tailor recommendations to the individual judge based on
the judge's past sentencing behavior.' 5' Lastly, the probation officer
uses the PSR to establish and maintain credibility throughout the judici-
ary, and is therefore likely to be meticulous when detailing sentencing
recommendations. 15 2 Probation officers are evaluated on their ability to
provide accurate and reasonable recommendations, and judges are very
powerful figures in this evaluation.153 Thus, in seeking to attain respect
from judges, the probation officers are greatly improving the criminal
justice system through providing detailed and accurate sentencing re-
ports. Expanding the role of probation officers through sentencing dele-
gation will only continue to improve the criminal justice system because
defendants will benefit from mental health counseling and treatment that
is appropriately tailored to their individual circumstances.
C. Probation Officers Already Play a Quasi-Judicial Role
Likely due to the high level of agreement between probation of-
ficers and judges, probation officers already play a quasi-judicial role in
the criminal justice system.154 In their everyday capacity, probation of-
ficers are entrusted with a wide level of discretion. As previously dis-
cussed, probation officers recommend sentencing conditions to the court
through PSRs. 55 Additionally, probation officers have the responsibility
to ensure that defendants follow the conditions set and to initiate pro-
ceedings if these conditions are violated.'56 Since probation conditions
are often extremely vague, such as the condition to "avoid undesirable
associates," probations officers are afforded wide latitude in determining
whether a defendant violated the condition and referring the matter to the
149 See Rosecrance, supra note 74, at 160 (quoting ALFRED BLUMSTEIN ET AL., RESEARCH
ON SENTENCING: THE SEARCH FOR REFORM 44 (National Academy Press 1983)).
150 See id. at 159; see also Weinberger, 268 F.3d at 362.
151 See Rosecrance, supra note 74, at 160.
152 See id.
153 See id. at 164-65 ("Judges can exert a considerable influence upon the career potential
of individual probation officers. Judicial praise for the quality of an officer's work is often
used as a basis for promotion").
154 See discussion about the unique role of probation officers, supra Part I.D.
155 See discussion of the PSR, supra Parts I.B-C.
156 See Czajkoski, supra note 55, at 11-12.
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court when they deem appropriate. 15 7 Although the probation officer can
determine if a violation occurred and refer such violations to the courts,
the ultimate control over the defendant still remains with the courts.
Sound familiar?
Given the quasi-judicial role probation officers already play, al-
lowing probation officers authority over mental health treatment for de-
fendants under the Eighth Circuit's rule is not such a stretch at all. In
fact, it is no different from any other sentencing matter courts already
delegate to probation officers. Allowing probation officers authority
over treatment decisions, with the courts retaining the ultimate authority
to either agree with the decision or modify the condition, amounts to
probation officers essentially recommending a condition of probation.
Therefore, since courts have relied upon probation officers to recom-
mend sentencing conditions for over forty years,158 courts should be al-
lowed to "extend" their sentencing delegations to the determination of
the necessity of mental health treatment. Arguably, probation officers
already determine whether or not a defendant should engage in mental
health treatment in the majority circuits, as judges often follow the pro-
bation officer's recommendations in the PSR.
D. Delegation to Probation Officers Promotes Judicial Economy
Probation officers will produce conditions of supervised release
similar to those that district judges would determine on their own, but
will reach these decisions at a much lower cost. Delegating these mental
health treatment decisions to probation officers, while keeping the ulti-
mate control in the hands of the court, is less costly because it frees the
hands of busy federal judges with overflowing dockets. Instead of
spending precious time to compose treatment conditions, the judge can
instead delegate the authority over treatment decisions to the probation
officer, who can develop this decision over time and observation of the
defendant. Moreover, a judge's composition of treatment conditions is
largely speculative because the judge has not personally observed the
defendant and cannot predict the effectiveness of the treatment or the
cooperation of the defendant at the outset. Requiring the judge, and only
the judge, to make this determination "underappreciates the role of the
probation officer and does not take into account what a burdensome pro-
position it would be to require the district courts to micro-manage each
defendant." 159
Authorizing sentencing delegation to probation officers, moreover,
is a better use of public resources. Probation officers are already paid to
157 Id. at 11.
158 See Bunzel, supra note 1, at 939, 942-43.
159 United States v. Weinberger, 268 F.3d 346, 363 (6th Cir. 2001) (Cohn, J., concurring).
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observe and work with defendants on a daily basis. Why not take this
one step further, and allow the probation officer to make decisions about
mental health treatment with the defendant, that will actually work for
the defendant, and to which the defendant will be able to adhere? This
would not take up much more of the probation officer's time, because it
is essentially an extension of what the probation officer is already doing.
But this would free up a lot more of the court's time. As previously
discussed, the court still has final authority over the decision, but perhaps
this delegation will lead to the defendant and probation officer coming
into court just one time to report the treatment decision and the reasons
for the decision to the court. This is much faster and less costly than the
alternative scenario, where the probation officer and defendant repeat-
edly appear in court because the defendant cannot stick to the conditions
of supervised release the judge laid out months, or even years prior, due
to persistent mental distress that the probation officer cannot exercise
discretion to remedy.
Additionally, district courts purposefully delegate matters to proba-
tion officers for a reason-because they need to. In the circuits that
merely follow the Peterson rule, district court judges have expressed
their trust in probation officers and recognized the benefits that delega-
tions of treatment decisions will have in their courtrooms. 160 Yet, the
circuit court judges have chastised the district court judges for simply
responding in a logical and efficient manner and asking probation of-
ficers for this much-needed assistance.161 These district court judges
trust their probation officers to recommend sentences after the defendant
is found guilty, but are being told by the appellate courts that they cannot
trust their probation officers, who work with the defendants throughout
the term of supervised release, to determine whether mental health treat-
ment would benefit the defendant. The circuits following Peterson are
sending an illogical message to the district court judges, which is damag-
ing to the defendants and to the courts.
160 See, e.g., United States v. Esparza, 552 F.3d 1088, 1089 (9th Cir. 2009) (the district
court delegated the decision of whether the defendant needed inpatient treatment to the proba-
tion officer); United States v. Heath, 419 F.3d 1312, 1315 (11th Cir. 2005) (the district court
delegated the decision of whether the defendant had to participate in mental health treatment as
a condition of supervised release to the probation officer).
161 See, e.g., Esparza, 552 F.3d at 1091 (holding that allowing the probation officer dis-
cretion to determine whether the defendant needed inpatient treatment as a condition of super-
vised release was impermissible); Heath, 419 F.3d at 1315 (holding that the district court's
delegation of the authority to decide whether a defendant will receive mental health treatment
to the probation officer was improper).
ARMS OF THE COURT
E. Delegation to Probation Officers Will Benefit Defendants
The probation officer is in the best position to determine whether
treatment and counseling sessions will be beneficial to the defendant.
Since the probation officer is the person most familiar with the defendant
and is in charge of supervising the defendant during the term of super-
vised release, the probation officer is bound to know the defendant on a
more personal level. Although the role of the probation officer has
changed a lot over the years, the 2006 monograph seems to restore the
probation officer back to its role as a social worker for the court. 162 The
2006 monograph directs the probation officer, in preparing the PSR, to
get the full picture of the defendant through an evaluation of the defen-
dant's childhood, family history, current financial circumstances, and liv-
ing situation.s63 Thus, it is the probation officer, not the court, who is
most familiar with the circumstances of the individual defendant.
Additionally, since the probation officer has returned to his role as a
specialized social worker for the court, the defendant will likely trust the
probation officer throughout the sentencing phase because the probation
officer represents the defendant's only hope for leniency at the hands of
the court.' 64 Similarly, the defendant and probation officer have likely
met on numerous occasions for presentence interviews, and have likely
developed some sort of relationship.16 5 Most importantly, the probation
officer supervises the defendant's actions during supervised release. It is
the probation officer, not the court, with whom the defendant checks in
on a regular basis. It is the probation officer, not the court, who wit-
nesses firsthand whether the defendant is making progress or violating
the conditions of supervised release. Therefore, it should be the proba-
tion officer, not the court, who should determine the defendant's need for
counseling and treatment sessions, because the probation officer is most
familiar with the plight of the defendant prior to the imposition of the
sentence, and throughout the term of supervised release.
CONCLUSION
This Note argued that authorizing delegations of limited sentencing
discretion to probation officers to make decisions about mental health
treatment produces a better policy outcome for both courts and defend-
ants because of the unique, quasi-judicial role probation officers already
play in the criminal justice system. Part I of this Note examined the
history and current role of probation officers. Part II of this Note dis-
162 See Bunzel, supra note 1, at 942-48. See generally 2006 Monograph, supra note 4.
163 See 2006 Monograph, supra note 4, at 111-24-31.
164 See Bunzel, supra note 1, at 945.
165 See id.
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cussed the constitutional and statutory provisions essential to evaluating
delegations of decisions regarding a defendant's mental health treatment
and the varying interpretations that have culminated in a circuit split.
Part III of this Note detailed the nuanced arguments of the circuit split
and evaluated the merits of the arguments from a policy perspective.
Described as the arms, eyes, and ears of the court, probation officers
are entrusted with many statutory duties. Probation officers recommend
sentences for defendants to district court judges after a careful evaluation
of the individual's circumstances. They are entrusted with supervising
defendants on supervised release and writing reports detailing whether
the defendant is in compliance with conditions of supervised release.
The determination of necessary treatment and counseling sessions is no
different from any of the aforementioned duties already entrusted to pro-
bation officers. Moreover, given that the court retains the ultimate au-
thority over the determination, the probation officer's actions do not
amount to much more than a traditional recommendation. The probation
officer determines whether treatment is necessary and beneficial, based
on his detailed observations of the defendant, and the court retains the
ability to accept, modify or reject the treatment. Therefore, the flexible
position the Eighth Circuit takes regarding delegation is not such a
shocking concept at all, but rather a logical and efficient development for
the judicial system.
This Note calls for the Supreme Court to resolve the circuit split
over whether the court can delegate the determination of mental health
treatment sessions to probation officers in the affirmative. This flexible
approach will ultimately reduce judicial costs and will result in the most
effective treatment for defendants on supervised release. Judges will not
be burdened with the task of determining whether mental health treat-
ment is necessary at the outset of sentencing, with little knowledge of
how the defendant's circumstances will change throughout the term of
supervised release. Instead, probation officers will determine the neces-
sity of mental health treatment with the insight gained through
presentence interviews, and the ongoing information collected through
frequent meetings during the term of supervised release. Thus, the flexi-
ble approach will produce the best outcome for both defendants and the
judiciary.
